Historically, it is most unfortunate that not long after Africa extricated itself from the hellish pangs of colonialism spurned around her by the contradictions of industrial Revolution of the 19th century, the continent and the entire humanity for over 40 years have contended with global insecurity occasioned by the recent Cold War between the United States and the then Soviet Union. As the Cold War lasted, and arguably till today, African security also remained under threat, thanks to a resurgence of neo-colonialism across the world. Today mankind has arrived the nuclear age and the bubble is about to burst. Today, not only the super powers but also the once pitied countries in the Third World countries in Asia and Latin America now engage one another in an unspeakable cut-throat competition in arms acquisition including the most lethal nuclear war-heads. The point is that this development posed very grave threat to the security of life to the entire mankind in general but also to that of Africa. In particular in this paper the author analyzed aspects of African security and constructed a new path to African security under the current nuclear regime.

Key words: Africa-Africa security, nuclear regime, twenty first century.

INTRODUCTION

The importance which African States attach to security is reflected in the Preamble of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union-AU). Specifically, the African heads of state and government declared that in order to translate their common determination to control their own destiny, to resist neo-colonialism in all its forms, to pursue the ideals of freedom, equality, justice and dignity essential for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples and for harnessing the natural and human resources of the continent as well as for consolidating their hard-won independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences, “conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained” (Brownlie, 1971).

Both among themselves and in their relations with the outside world, African States also declared their adherence to five basic principles for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. These principles are;

(i) Sovereign equality of all states.
(ii) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
(iii) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
(iv) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, and
(v) Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

Essentially the five principles conform to the provision of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. The basic assumption of African heads of state is that states will abide by the laid down rules of the game and that the translation of these principles into practical policies will crystallize into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress (Brownlie, 1971).

The nature and concept of African security and the 21st century nuclear regime definition of Africa.

Depending on one’s intellectual and ideological predisposition, Africa can be regarded either as a unit with clearly defined geopolitical, demographic, legal institutions and organizational characteristics or as a mere political and cultural conglomeration. Thus, for some analysts
and observers, it is possible to talk of African security whereas for others African security is far-fetched because the idea of “African-ness does not exist”. (Nweke, 1985)

This later view was religiously adhered to not only by the imperialist powers, especially France, Belgium and Portugal, but also by some American scholars writing with a view to formulating an African policy in the 1960s. Prior to independence, France, Portugal, and Spain defined their dependent territories in Africa as integral parts of the metropolitan country. France applied this argument to justify her opposition to Algerian independence; and on joining the UN in 1955, both Portugal and Spain claimed that their colonies were not “territories” as defined in chapter XI of the UN Charter, but integral parts of metropolitan Portugal and Spain. African assertion of the right of self-determination was resisted, except within the “national framework” of the imperialist powers (Nogueira, 1963).

In an essay entitled “Does Africa Exist?” presented before a highly enlightened American audience in 1960, Malville Herskovits maintains that Africa is a geographic fiction. He argues that the map is invested with an authority imposed on it by the map makers, and warns of the danger of according colonial designations a degree of reality they do not possess (Herskovits, 1960). But if Africa as an “entity” was the product of cartographers, so too was the “New World”, the Near East, and the war-whacked ‘Europe’ from the twelfth century to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.

It was the conjunction with the impact of colonialism, that gave rise to the growth of social consciousness, political identity, and ideologies that are specifically African (Mazrui, 1967). According to Nyerere (1963), colonialism “created in African continent a sense of ones(...) Africans, all over the continent(...) looked at the European, looked at one anther, and knew that in relation to the Europeans they were one” (Nyerere, 1963; Murdok, 1959). In a speech at the fifteenth session of the UN General Assembly, on 23 September, 1960, Kwame Nkrumah rejected the Franco-Belgian-Portuguese claims on Africa and insisted that “Africa is not, and can never be, an extension of Europe” (Mazrui, 1967).

With progress towards decolonization in 1960 and after the debate on the legitimacy of European claims on Africa was universally accepted as untenable, but the issue is yet not resolved.

For international peace and security, African nationalist’s argument is tenable, and a preponderance of the opinions of experts tends to support it. The United Nations and other international organizations have consistently used the geographic location of Africa in distinguishing it from other regional actors in international politics. Consequently, Africa is defined to include “the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa” (UN, 1961)

At the time the OAU Charter came into force on 13 September, 1963, there were forty-one member states. The number of independent African states is today over fifty (Legun, 1981). Each state is faced with internal and external security problems, which reflect in microcosm the larger security problems of Africa as a whole. The need to assure security at the state, rather than the continental, level can be said to be one of the major dilemmas of African security.

Categories of African security

While the conception of the security by India’s Subrahmanyan clearly points to the need for security policies that foster the growth of liberal democratic regimes, the Latin American version, despite its merits, appears as a calculated theoretical construct in support of the phenomenon of militarism of Latin America (especially Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) which countries have gained notoriety for their policies of intensive repression, and the ideology of national security has often been adumbrated to justify such repression.

Although the concept of security as an ideology is more advanced and sophisticated in India and Latin America than in Africa, the ideological and policy orientations are nearly always similar in these three major areas which are non-aligned-capitalist oriented; and like Latin America, Africa, since 1960, has experienced an unprecedented upsurge of militarism that is as violent in its origin as it is repressive in its governance. Unlike both Latin America and India however, Africa is a case sui generis in that, among other things, it is more geopolitically and culturally divided, and in addition a late starter in development cumsecurity race and in the game of international politics (Nweke, 1985).

Consequently, the problem of African security contains many strains of national security from Asia and Latin America, but with major differences that are peculiar to Africa. Our definition of African security will rest on a tripod, and it is this tripod that will be used as a framework for our analysis of the associated concepts and doctrines.

African security can be defined not only as the preservation intact of African independence, peoples, institutions, and identity, but also as the advancement of African integrity and interests within and outside Africa through military, economic, ideological, diplomatic, and socio-cultural instrumentalities. It is a problem with three interrelated dimensions:

(1) Ability to perceive and utilize the foundations which provide, supports, and shape the means to achieve African security.
(2) Ability to influence the shaping of the international system within which African security must be achieved.
(3) The cultural provision of African security through rational choice of appropriate socio-economic, political and military policies and strategies (Larson, 1975; Schlesinger, 1960).
The critical element in African security lies, therefore, in the ability of African states to demonstrate the capacity and will not only to perceive and contain internal and external threats, but also to formulate appropriate policy and strategy for the advancement of African interest (Eccles, 1965). Thus, the irreducible ‘core’ of African interests, and indeed the national interests of individual African states is African (or national) security as defined above. It is the most valued or ‘vital’ interest, and it has to do with the strengthening of domestic, political, social, economic, industrial, technological and military bases for the purposes of self-preservation, unity, independence, well-being and socio-economic equality of Africans. Other interests such as human equality and justice, world peace and security (including the issue of arms race and disarmament among the nuclear weapon states-USA, Russia, Britain, France, China, and more recently India, Pakistan, and South Africa – are important, but certainly secondary to the ‘vital’ interest of African (or national) security.

It follows, therefore, that the achievement or otherwise of African security is to a large extent a function of the impact of ethnicity and nationalism on state security. The problem lies in the fact that while sovereign African states aspire to be nation-states, that is, to back up their oligarchical and hierarchical power structures with horizontal bonds, feeling, and consciousness of group identity and solidarity in what is termed the process of “nation building”, most, if not all remain states (Berghe, 1965; Lloyd, 1967; Apter, 1965; Nettl, 1968).

Ethnicity affects African security by reinforcing the autonomous reality of the state. The highly politicized and mobilized ethnic groups, such as the Kikuyu, Luo (Kenya), Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba (Nigeria), Wolof (Senegal), Mende, Temne (Sierra Leone), Xhosa, Zulu (South Africa), Ewe, Kabre (Togo), Mossi, Bambara (Burkina Faso), and Bemba, Lozi (Zambia) have formed political participation and have denounced government policies as parochial and un-nationalistic (Smock and Smock, 1975; Smock, 1971; Pye 1963; Coleman and Rosberg, 1964).

**Definition and variants of nuclear regime**

Simply put, a nuclear regime may be thought of as a system of international obligations (formal accords, tacit commitments, and informal understandings), national force structures (number and what kinds of weapons), and doctrines (when, where, why, how, and which nuclear weapons ought to be used) that together govern the role of nuclear weapons in war, peace and diplomacy (Gompert, 1977). Each regime is based on a set of values and goals and on certain premises about the dangers and virtues of nuclear weapons. Each is shaped by certain expectations about the political and technological future. A preference for one regime over others should be based not only upon sympathy with its underlying values but also upon satisfaction that the specified characteristics of the regime would in fact help deliver those values. Even then, doubts about the feasibility of bringing about desired conditions may accuse one to lean toward a more realistic, if less satisfying, alternative, perhaps in the belief that the second best is a logical and necessary rung on the ladder towards the best.

The pursuit of contradictory objectives is the order of policy failure. For instance, one might favour having those states with nuclear weapons pledge never to be the first to use them, yet at the same time be averse to the removal of all American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe lest such a step weaken Western confidence and encourage Russian conventional military pressure. Especial use of these policies would either undermine the value of the tactical nuclear weapons in deterring conventional aggression or vitiate the “no-first-use” pledge or both (Hoffman, 1966).

Existing arms control literature is a cornucopia of concept critiques, and proposals. Too often, at least of late, there has been little attempt to tie separate strands together, to scrutinize particular objectives in light of other objectives, and to develop, out of a welter of prescriptions, a coherent sense of direction. Admittedly, the regimes presented in this paper are abstractions; they are abstractions of the future rests on the premise that nuclear arms and how to govern them.

The first regime (in essence, the current regime project- ed into the future) rests on the premise that nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia how-ever they offend our intuitive sense of safety and propor-tionality, have in fact fostered – if not forced – moderations and stability in international politics. This regime advocates, and sees good prospects for a continuation of the “sys- tem” that has prevailed for at least the last 30 years—a system that has stood the test of time and tension.

The second regime (an ensemble of arms control prescript- ions) is derived from the belief that nuclear weapons are an inescapable burden and that our efforts should be devoted to reducing dependence on nuclear weapon in the conduct of world politics and the maintenance of international security. It would quite explicitly entrust nuclear weapons with one and only one purpose: to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. The availability or use of nuclear weapons for other purposes would be sharply constrained by an assortment of unilateral and multilateral measures.

The third regime (a “denuclearized” world) does not accept the fate of an eternal nuclear predicament. It sees nuclear weapons not as a manageable burden but as an intolerable menace and therefore seeks to ban their use. The nuclear system seems stable, but certain stresses and contradictions may eventually lead to its collapse and calamity. This expectation and the belief that it is morally
corrosive for peace and a stable world politics to depends in perpetuity upon the capacity and expressed willingness of leaders to destroy one another’s societies, underscore the need to conceive of workable and enforceable arrangements for the abolition of nationally held nuclear weapons.

Finally, the fourth Regime (one of “strategic deterioration”) anticipates a number of plausible developments in technology and politics over the next 20 to 30 years that could undermine strategic stability, shake world politics, and perhaps increase the chances of nuclear conflicts. Specifically, it confronts several adverse possibilities; extensive nuclear proliferation, technological disequilibria and nuclear imbalance between the United States and Russia. It looks less at how we can improve conditions than at how we might attenuate the perils of a forbidden nuclear future. In a sense, the implicit link between the third (millennial) regime and the fourth (pessimistic) regime closes the circle for movement from the present conditions to a denuclearized world which might be politically possible only if catalyzed by a resurgence of nuclear danger (Kissinger 1977; Schell 1976; IISS, 1976).

The 21st century nuclear regime, with which this paper is concerned most could be taken to refer to the first regime (that is the current nuclear regime), projected into the future.

**THREATS TO AFRICAN SECURITY**

Thus, African’s position in world politics and international division of labour has a considerable impact not only on economic and technological underdevelopment of the continent, but also on the ability of African states to deal with internal and external threats to security. The dilemma lies on how it perceives the dual character of threats to African security in the global struggle between bourgeois capitalist countries and proletarian labouring countries and at the same time preserves the African initiative and freedom to formulate strategies both for development and for countering these threats (Nweke, 1985)

We can identify from the foregoing analysis five major categories of threats to African security. These are economic and military dependence, conflicts and wars within states-inter-state antagonisms and conflicts, South Africa’s belligerency, and external great-power intervention in African affairs. Each of these threats cannot be seen as an isolated problem but as inextricably entwined. It follows, therefore, that in formulating deterrence and defence strategies the interrelatedness of the threats especially the ways in which they are internally and internationally linked must be taken into consideration. There is thus a sense in which it can be argued that the four specifically inter-African threats – economic and military dependence, internal wars, inter-state conflicts and South Africa-cannot be effectively countered without radical changes both in the foundations of African security and in the international balance of military and economic powers. An innocuous strategy that calls for the construction of an all-African collective bargaining in North-South dialogue and in multilateral economic negotiations of the United Nations (UN) and European Economic Community (EEC) is meaningless if it is not backed up by economic and military power to make African position credible (Gosovic, 1972; Zartman, 1971)

**OPTIONS FOR AFRICAN SECURITY**

The most important implication of the new strategy for development in the 2000s revolves around military-strategic security options. A wide range of choices has already emerged not only from the rhetoric of African diplomacy, but also from concrete measures undertaken by African states as well as from African scholars. These options are principally four: isolationism, regionalism, globalism, and nuclearization (Nweke 1985s)

**Strategy 1**

**Isolationism**

This policy orientation entails Africa keeping aloof from political or economic entanglements with other countries. Unlike autarchy which stresses national self-sufficiency and non-reliance on imports and economic aid, the option is one of inward-looking oriented policy with strong economic nationalism and a neo-mercantilist diplomacy based, on the one hand, on the development of protectionist defense industry, on accumulation of capital from export of primary and manufactured goods and services, and on the other a considerable restriction of imports, especially of luxury goods and food. The African members of OPEC – Algeria, Gabon Libya and Nigeria for instance will press higher and higher oil price increases in OPEC. The peasant economies including Nigeria will push for increased levels of production of crops food crops and vegetables under the Green Revolution Programme.

The adoption of isolationist strategy by Africa must be considered against the background of the fragility of the domestic economy, which could be aggravated not only by an increasing rate of inflation, but also by failures in green revolution expectations, as well as by overcommitment to politics, so that the rational behaviour would be to limit foreign commitments to the barest minimum judged necessary to sustain modernization at home. This implies that economic foreign policy and economic development policy should be one and indivisible. A more important implication of this orientation is that the 2000s will witness increasing intervention of foreign powers and MNCs in the economic and political spheres which will further weaken African states and undermine African security.

The most important implication of the isolationist op-
tion concerns the problem of internal security—the maintenance of law and order and meeting the challenges of political conflicts, strikes, violence, terrorism, and arson arising from ethnicism, anomie and socio-economic inequality associated with the process of transformation from a capitalist to a dirigist political economy.

Political and economic repression is a negative approach to the problem of internal security and usually a product of the very forces it is intended to contain. Frank (1981) has shown how this approach has led in Latin America and some African countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia) not only to the militarization of the state, but also to the institutionalization of authoritarianism. An isolationist posture which relies on instrumentalities of political, economic and military repression as a means of resolving the problem of internal security will exacerbate rather than eliminate the source of tension and in doing so impede development.

To succeed in handling the problem of internal security in the process of development an isolationist posture must adopt an objective approach. This approach calls for the construction of appropriate national policies for political socialization, civil defence, police and intelligence organizations, and armed forces imbued with pan-African values. It must be remembered that the problem of internal security originates as much from domestic structure as from external intervention; so that the thrust of any policies formulated with a view to handling the problem must take into account of the external forces and the means of containing them.

An isolation orientation in the 2000s will be the more likely if African states, especially the leading ones such as Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Ethiopia, despite an active role in Africa, find their policies rebuffed or their influence shrinking around the continent. Such was in fact the outcome of Libyan and Nigerian interventions in Chad. In the case of Nigeria, not only that the warring factions, after the debacle of the second Kano Conference in April 1979, found themselves instantaneously united against Nigeria, but they also ordered Nigerian troops out of their country and formed a new government contrary to the Kano Accord (Nweke, 1981). In circumstances like this, policy makers will then be confronted with the choice of either pressing on despite reverses or reducing external commitments so that resources will be available for modernization of the economy.

But isolationist policy is unlikely for a number of reasons. The creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 must be seen as a step of crucial importance towards developing a new structural outlook which offers a set of new conditions. Attempts at economic development and poverty alleviation at the continental level have given use to such programmes an NEPAD (New partnership for Africa's development) and the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals). In this content, isolationism may not be a panacea. Again the historical pattern of African diplomacy has been that of active participation in international politics in the none aligned movement, in African and Middle East affairs and in various global orders. Another reason why isolationism may prove unattractive is that the existence of a web of material-oriented interests among the political and economic classes in African countries promises a substantial stake in enhanced ties with the outside world.

Strategy II
Regionalism

This option has three interrelated components from the point of view of security, namely military, political and economic. The common denominator among the in terms of orientation is the establishment of a regional security arrangement as hereby envisaged which should not be such as to involve African countries in bilateral or multilateral pacts with foreign powers, but should consist of an institutionalized common defence framework.

African leaders have already agreed on the creation of an AU-backed African standby force (ASF) by the year 2010. The ASF is to have a force level of 15,000 troops and to be made up of five regional brigades. This was the decision of the peace and Security Council (psc) of the AU which has been operational since December 2003 (first session: 16 March 2004) when the relevant protocol entered into Force. But the precise character of the Defence Force has not been delineated; nor has a strategic doctrine been formulated on the basis of which the force will be trained, organized, and indoctrinated. It is however not too fanciful to speculate that what is envisaged is a polishing of Nkrumah’s idea of an African High Command, which will serve the dual functions of defence against external aggression and of peacekeeping within Africa (Nkrumah, 1967).

In order to fully exploit the capabilities of an African High command in its dual roles, it is necessary to have the forces located at five strategic regional points around the continent and coordinated from a command headquarters, to be sited in Nigeria. The five regional forces, given below, could serve as regional Sub-Committee of the High command:

1. Central Region (9 countries): Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo people’s Republic Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Zaire.
3. Northern Region (8 countries): Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.
5. Western Region (16 countries): Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’
Voire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Burkina Faso.

There are several advantages of this type of regional security arrangement. One of the most obvious advantages is the possibility of “flexible response” to threat situations wherever they may occur around the continent. In such eventualities, the regional sub-committee force will immediately be mobilized, and the point of full mobilization will come when the other four sub-committee forces are progressively involved to deal with the threat.

The disadvantages of an African High Command centre on the political, economic, and administrative problems of a peace-keeping force of a non-supranational organization such as the AU (Nweke, 1981; Iyanda and Stremluu, 1971). One of the most difficult political and administrative problems concerns the legal basis and a specific nature that a peacekeeping operation will take and the manner in which the actions are to be initiated and conducted. This problem is exacerbated by the maximalist and minimalist interpretations of the AU Charter. The former has no illusions regarding initial authorization. The latter maintains that what is not completely spelled out is not legally authorized implying that independent states in non-supranational organizations owe no supreme obligations to other associations that reject this interpretation and envisage authorization to flow from the collective African political organization.

Another problematic issue concerns how a peacekeeping operation, assuming assurance over its legality, is to be financed. Should its expenses be integrated with the annual budget of the AU, or should special peacekeeping accounts be created, or should only the participants in a peacekeeping operation bear the costs? This is a problem which confronted the OAU peace-keeping force in Chad; and Nigeria which had shown the greatest interest in the maintenance of that force by providing the bulk of the money for the maintenance of the operation, found herself in an ignominious situation in which she could no longer sustain her troops in the face of mounting internal economic difficulties.

The main dilemma facing an AU peacekeeping force is political. Essentially, it revolves around the question of whether to take a peacekeeping initiative and then seek to build a consensus around it, or to engineer a consensus before implementing a peacekeeping action. In other words, the political control problem hinges on the various national attitudes towards collective action which idiosyncrasies on this vital issue of security that is, of forgoing the necessary “political will”, is not to wait until an aggressive act or an internal war has become obvious before a decisive move to provide security is undertaken but to engineer the initial political consensus and then to create within it a defence system not only capable of, but also resilient enough, to deal with any security problem whether internally or externally induced.

Although these strategies may sound utopian, they are realistic. Their realism is a reflection both of the imperatives of African independence, peace and progress and of African historical experience. It was Britain that gave the Middle East an Arab League instead of an Arab nation; and in the case of Africa, no one could say categorically the kind of underground manoeuvring, probably with Western initiative and support that led to the Addis Ababa compromise of 1963. The important point is that the 1963 compromise has become anachronistic in the light of the new strategy of “collective self-reliant and self-sustaining development”.

There are many options open to Africa in the context of a regional security system, but it is certainly not the case of a choice between “denuclearization” and “development”. It seems more rational to think first about “development”, since, as a concept and a state of affairs, it encompasses quantitative and qualitative changes in the economic, political, socio-cultural, as well as scientific and security arenas. This means that “development” incorporates national armament, and once achieved, is irreversible. In this sense, development is an “irreducible core” of African security, whereas disarmament is not (Nweke, 1980).

In this sense at least the development of indigenous military industry and technology is not the same thing as the development of external sources of arms procurement. The former connotes “self-reliance” and the latter “dependency”. One of the paradoxes of African independence is that it is most vocally untrue and absolutely dependent on the industrial capitalist and communist powers for it to be credible. Under a normal situation, which in any case, is uncharacteristic of international politics, this paradox might not be apparent. In a situation of conflict or war the contradiction becomes very obvious indeed.

It is against this theoretical-empirical background that the military-strategic concept of arms race, arms control, disarmament, and arms limitation must be discussed in relation to African security. They are more meaningful to both the nuclear powers and the military-significant states than to non-nuclear militarily-insignificant African states.

The only concept that may be said to be of any relevance to African security is arms race (UNCD, 1978; Carlton, 1975). And this is so in part if we take this concept to mean the process by which rival powers or states build up armaments either by local production or by procurement in competition with one another in order not to be at a disadvantage in case of war. Africa falls into three categories on the basis of the region’s involvement in arms race. It is interesting to note that the supersolvers (especially South Africa, the Maghreb, Libya, Egypt, Chad, Somalia, and Ethiopia) are countries, born by internal conflicts or involved in war. The middle-solvers comprise such countries as Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia, which situate directly in one of the Zones of conflict or another (for example, Nigeria and the frontline states), or which aspire to play a leading role in...
Africa and are targets for external aggression or communal conflict (for example, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zaire). The low-armers consist in the main of the mini-states, which lack the financial resources to engage in arms race except through dependence on external largesse to which are normally attached stringent political and economic strings.

The question arises as to what African states could or should do to curb the on-going conventional arms race in Africa. This question applies more strongly to the super- and middle-range armers than to eliminating the factors propelling the arms race in Africa. These factors include the incidence of local and inter-state conflicts, fear of insecurity, the United States-Russia strategic balance that protrudes in rivalry in the arms race in Africa and the Indian Ocean, economic inequality among state actors in international politics, research and development in the profit motive associated with research and development in the military-industrial complex of the great powers. (UN, 1980)

There are factors over which African states do not seem to have any control whatsoever and can hardly effect a change I those directions. They should, therefore, aim first and foremost at reducing, if not completely eliminating, sources that lead to intra-African conflicts. This entails strengthening the principles of pan-Africanism and of the pan-African machinery for conflict resolution. There should also be established at the continental AU level the maximum limit individual states should appropriate in their national budgets for arms procurement as opposed to development of local arms manufacture. A look at the tables on the relative burden of military expenditures (MILEX) of African states suggests that MILEX are above the percent expenditures of gross national income (GNP) and will foster rather than curb arms race in Africa. In this way it is possible to integrate into national policies on government expenditure measures for reducing factors that propel the arms race.

In addition to these specifically intra-African measures are international actions at the level both of foreign policy and of international relations. The first consists in the collective African posture towards the global system of inequality, while the second consists in all facets of interaction, governmental, or non-governmental, in which African states are involved internationally. Collective action and pressure directed at effecting changes in the international regime structure could help to narrow the poverty-affluence gap in the world and indirectly reduce the incidence of governmental and non-governmental organizations to key policy-making personnel of the great powers and their military-industrial complexes could play a vital role influencing a downward trend in the arms race.

The policy of collective security within the African regional framework will help in the initiation and pursuit of the measures for curbing the arms race. However, as Zagoria has correctly observed success or otherwise will hinge on the attitude of the United States and Russia towards détente and problems of mutual accommodation. He makes six specific suggestions with regard to the role of the superpowers to complement efforts at curbing the arms race, chief among which are a “rapid return to arms control negotiations” and steps to defuse some of the world’s existing “hot spots”. He mentions specifically “Southern Africa” and “Middle East”, and the “need to progress rapidly towards political settlements that will dampen these disputes” (UN, 1980).

Except for the low-armers, which, depending on circumstances, may one day become middle-or super-armers, disarmament and arms limitation are of considerable importance in the security calculations of Africa. Disarmament can take at least two forms: it may be a penal destruction or reduction of the arms of a defeated country; or a bilateral or multilateral agreement applying to all states or to a group of states in a specific regional setting (Myrdal, 1976). Whether national or international, African states see disarmament as applying not so much to themselves as to the nuclear-or other military-powers. But they have a vital role to play to promote disarmament, and this role will be discussed below in the context of the implications for political regionalism.

**Strategy III**

**Globalism**

The third alternative policy option for Africa in the present millennium is globalism. The emphasis here will be on global interdependence and a foreign policy of universal cooperation based on equality and justice and on strong ecumenical and pan-African desiderata.

The attractiveness of this orientation from the point of view of security is predicated on the realization that African economy, in addition to its fragility and backwardness is highly sensitive and/ or vulnerable to changes or policies of the industrialized countries, especially the advanced western economies. Thus, in discussing the impact of the world monetary crisis of 1971-72 Alhaji Shagari admitted that “one of the reasons for the devaluation of the Naira in 1973 was to react to international situation in a new environment”. The recent efforts of the central Bank of Nigeria at recapitalizing all banks before December 2005 are equally reactions to the international market system.

On the substantive issue of the international monetary system reforms, African diplomacy, while reflecting the non-aligned stance, has consistently been directed at the “democratization” of the IMF not only to permit “all countries to benefit equally and to play a useful and constructive role in the working of the system”, but also to invest “global control of liquidity in the whole international community acting through the IMF”. There have, however, been other instances in which African states have attempted to pursue a specifically globalise foreign policy.
The foregoing scenarios indicate the possibilities and questions. What does the concept "nuclear option" signify? What is the substance of Africa's nuclear posture in the 2000s? To what extent is Africa’s strategy a reflection or otherwise of the current trend in the global nuclear option debates and developments? How are the developments reflected in African debates on the issue? What are the costs and benefits of the nuclear option?

**DEFINITION OF THE NUCLEARIZATION OPTION**

By Nuclearization option in this context we mean the determination by African countries to acquire nuclear capability not just for the purpose of power generation but for the production of nuclear weapons as well. The determination to acquire nuclear capability in the context of African development and regional security would seem to be the only way to make the doctrine of self-reliance credible and to underwrite African independence and survivability in the unpredictable 2000s.

As an analytic category, the nuclear option has three aspects or elements, each of which is critical in terms of its implications. The first is the determination, that is, the decision or the strong resolve to move forward and acquire the capacity for achieving an object or end. The second element of the nuclear option is the definition of purpose, which is, aim, goal, or object towards which one or a group strives; the third element, which is implied in our definition, is the effect, that is, the result or outcome, which is the combined product of determination and purpose. The nuclear option is thus an act of making a "choice", and in an international political system in which sovereign states are still the principal actors, the nuclear option concept connotes "freedom to choose". The African statesmen are not unaware of these semantic subtleties; and in the Lagos Plan of Action, they refer specifically to the imperative of acquiring the ability to make the right choice when the time comes (Marwah and Schulz, 1975).

**Strategy IV**

**Nuclearization**

The foregoing scenarios indicate the possibilities and limitations of Africa’s role in world politics and the ability of African states to preserve and foster their collective identity and interest and at the same time contribute to international peace and security. In view of the current trends in the global debates and developments vis-à-vis Africa’s development strategy in the 2000s with its emphasis on self-reliance and security in food, industry, energy, defence, transportation, communication, as well as science and technology, the nuclear option not only offers attractive possibilities for the realization of these goals, but also seems quite consistent with threat-response perceptions of leading African statesmen and intellectuals.

Our analysis of the nuclear option in the context of African security will, therefore, address five interrelated questions. What does the concept “nuclear option” signify? What is the substance of Africa’s nuclear posture? One of several of such instances is their participation in UN peacekeeping operations. While this orientation is most likely to continue in the 2000s a number of factors could unsettle the posture. The failure of the Lagos Plan of Action to provide the alchemy for the problems of food shortage and a more balanced development could not only trigger and/or exacerbate political crisis within the AU, but also make the weaker states highly dependent on economic and financial largesse by the capitalist West.

There is also the objective reality that Africa cannot hold its own in multilateral programmes with the great powers, because of her industrial, military and technological inferiority and of diplomacy without ideology. This latter point evokes another limitation concerning the division of the world into two ideological-military camps, which, as they stand, are irreconcilable. Even if the resulting gigantomachy suits their respective industrial-technological and military infrastructure the same could not be said of neo-colonial economies like Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, Senegal, and a host of other Afro-capitalist states.

Furthermore, there is likely to be very little domestic support for globalise policies, which will be seen to involve considerable economic sacrifice for Africans and an unacceptable diversion away from the South African problem. In emphasizing the limitations of the African political economy and military capability for opting with globalise interdependence, we want to imply that national outlays in certain, though not necessarily all, aspects of involvements represent a zero-sum equation in which the ordinary African will be the net loser. But there is no other way to achieve greatness than through endurance, hard work, and sacrifice, all of which are elements of the doctrine of self-reliance.

**The present global nuclear scenario**

There are currently eight states that have successfully detonated nuclear weapons. Five are considered to be "nuclear weapons states", an internationally-recognised status conferred by the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons, these countries are United States, Russia (successor-state to the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France and China. Since the formulation of the NPT, three non-signatory states of the NPT have conducted nuclear tests. They are India, Pakistan and North Korea. Apart from these eight countries no country in the world as of 2001 has tested the nuclear weapons. Countries like Israel, South Africa, Iraq and Iran are suspected to possess the weapon. As of February 4 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) referred Iran to the United Nation’s Security Council in response to concern that Iran is developing a nuclear programme.

In Africa, apart from South Africa, which by the 1980s...
has developed a nuclear programme which focused on both gun-type and implosion-type nuclear devices (Alb-right and Hinderstein, 1515, 2001). Egypt, South Africa and Libya are classified as countries of nuclear strategic concern (Okeke, 2007). However Egypt had a nuclear weapon research program from 1954 to 1967. Egypt has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (federation of American scientists 2005). South Africa produced six nuclear weapons in the 1980s, but disassembled them in the early 1990s. In 1979 there was a putative detection of a Clandestine nuclear test in the Indian Ocean, and it has long been speculated that it was potentially a test by South African perhaps in collaboration with Israel, though this has never been confirmed. South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 (federation of America scientists, 2000). Libya signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. On December 19, 2003 after the U.S-led invasion of Iraq and the October 2003 interception of Pakistani-designed centrifuge parts sent from Malaysia (as part of A.Q. Khan’s proliferation ring), Libya admitted to possessing a nuclear weapon program and simultaneously announced its intention to end it and dismantle all existing weapons of mass destruction to be verified by unconditional inspections (Nuclear Treaty Initiative 2006). Due to international pressure, Libya decided to dismantle her nuclear programme in December 2003.

**Africa’s nuclear posture, 1980 to date.**

It has to be borne in mind that collectively African countries have no strategic intention to engage in nuclear proliferation. At its first ordinary session, held at Cairo in July 1964 and latter in Libya in 1983, independent African countries signed a protocol in which “they solemnly declared their readiness to undertake… not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons…” this is the Pelindaba treaty. African leaders felt convinced that making Africa a nuclear weapon free zone, NWFZ, will best protect their states against possible nuclear attacks. Independently, the Lagos plan of Action of April 1980 to 2003.

**Africa’s nuclear option debate**

In the inter-African debate over whether or not to go nuclear, the domestic and international configurations of African security are welded together in response to changes in international balance of power, influence, and opportunities. For development and mutual co-operations are weighed against their impacts on domestic structure and the possibilities for survival not just as sovereign political entities, but also as a socio-cultural community with a common weltanschauung.

The most controversial view in recent times was expressed by Professor Ali Mazrui in the Reith lectures of 1980, in which he called on Africa to join the nuclear power club in order to narrow “the gap between its physical centrality by military marginality” in world politics. The acquisition of nuclear capability by Nigeria, Zaire and black-ruled South Africa will not only place Africa in the mainstream of international politics, but also teach the world an old lesson in a new context, namely, that wild mushrooms are dangerous. According to Mazrui: “The triumvirate of African diplomatic power before the end of the century will consist of Nigeria, Zaire and black-ruled South Africa (Hovet, 1963, 1960; Mazrui 1980).

Couched in paradoxical terms, the essence of Mazrui’s thesis on the nuclear option is that by embarking on a nuclear development programme, Africa would be better placed to recapture its historical central position as the “Garden of Eden”, from which it was removed by European colonialism, than by continuing as a peripheral actor in world politics. Here, the impact of imperialism and the argument against neo-colonialism are merged with a plea for a collective determination to break what India’s Subrahmanya aptly describes as “nuclear myths and realities” (Subrahmanyan, 1982). Acquisition of nuclear weapons would, therefore, be seen as a means of forcing the great powers to acknowledge Africa’s claim to be treated seriously as a military power.

On this purely political-psychological foundation rests much of the debate on whether so vigorous and as much politicized a country as Nigeria should embark on nuclear acquisition. One school of thought, who can be termed the “pronuclear” school, maintains that acquisition of nuclear capability by Nigeria is necessary;

1. To break the monopoly of the atomic powers, (Ibikunle, 1976).
2. To build a strong country with a strong defence establishment.
3. To provide a countervailing force against nuclear South Africa (Okoli, 1980; Kakali, 1981).

Ex-President Shehu Shagari, his former minister of Defence, Professor Iya Abubakar, the Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Professor F.N. Ndili, and a host of other scholars in Nigerian Universities and the National Institute For Policy and Strategic Studies at Kuru, near Jos, belong to this school.

The second school of thought on the nuclear option is antinuclear”. Professor Aluko, a proponent of this school, poses the question: “can a nuclear option to ensure the defence of the continent be thinkable in the next decade?” (Aluko 1981). His answer, predicated on three objectives and two tenuous rationales, is that “becoming a nuclear threat from South Africa is unconvincing, on the false assumption that South Africa would continue to intervene in any conflict with Nigeria in the same “indirect” manner as she intervened during the Nigerian civil war”. The nuclear option is not defined, nor is it recognized in the analysis that as the causes and characters of conflicts change, so does the nature of intervention.

Professor Aluko is probably correct in arguing that the cost of nuclear plant uranium enrichment and reprocess-
Among the strongest arguments in favour of the nuclear option are the imperatives of independent self-reliant development and security in the context of the qualitative and quantitative developments in nuclear technology and by South Africa and the perceived nuclear threat from that country.

At present four African states, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria either already have or are actively seeking to acquire nuclear capability. Together with Zaire and Ghana, they constitute the six “nuclear threshold states” of Africa, which can provide the foundation for a nuclear Africa. South Africa’s collaboration with the capitalist West in nuclear weapons development as well as the determination to achieve accelerated industrial and technological development, are the principal forces that stand in favour of policy coherence among African states on the nuclear option. This is further reinforced by the diminishing possibility for a rapprochement between the rest of Africa and South Africa, and by the increasingly attractive and compelling determination by the threshold states to play a leading role in the movement towards total African emancipation from neo-colonialism and military and economic paternalism (Jaster, 1980).

Although both Nigeria (27 September, 1968) and Libya (26 May, 1975) have ratified the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Egypt, which has signed but not ratified the Treaty, has a nuclear reactor provided by the then Soviet Union (Marwan and Schulz, ibid). The Egyptians operate the reactor under Soviet (Russian) safeguards. Nigeria has no nuclear safeguard agreement in force with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required by the NPT. Libya started its nuclear programme in 1982 with the assistance of former Soviet Union. In December 2003, Libyan officials conceded, during meetings with IAEA, that the country had imported natural uranium and centrifugal and conversion equipment, and that it had constructed pilot scale centrifuge facilities. It has decided to abandon the nuclear programme. Several African states have already embarked on a nuclear development programme and that others may follow.

In the case of Nigeria, the potentials for nuclear power development are available and are being exploited. For example, the military regime of Murtala Mohammed launched Nigeria into the nuclear race when it established by the decree of 1 September, 1976 (Financial Times, 1976) the Nigerian Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC), with the responsibility for prospecting and mining radioactive minerals, construction and maintenance of nuclear plants both for electric power generation and for research into peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The existence of the essential nuclear raw material, uranium, has considerably encouraged Nigeria’s nuclear power development programmes. There are large quantities of uranium deposits in the Gombe area of Bauchi State, and in neighbouring Francophone Niger. Although at present mined by the French commissionat Energie Atomique, the latter resources are also available to Nigeria since she has a controlling investment interest of 16 percent in the Techli mining permit covering an area of 2,000 square kilometres (OECD, 1977).

Uranium production in Niger amounted to 1,460 tonnes proliferation, including the acquisition of nuclear capability in 1976, out of a total world production of 22,193 tonnes. Other African producers, excluding South Africa, included Gabon (800 tonnes I 1975) and Zaire (25,600 tonnes pre-1972). It has been projected that before the mid-2005, Central African Republic will be one of the major uranium producers. As of 2005, the South African authorities have undertaken a pre-feasibility study for the construction of the Aflease Gold and uranium facility which will produce up to 3,390 tonnes per year (source: uranium 2005 resources, production and demand; OECD publishing, 2006) Much of South Africa’s uranium production, put in 1976 at 3,412 tonnes, comes from Namibian mines. Uranium availability in Africa, including South Africa, in the 1980s and 1990s is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Uranium production in Africa 1980s-1990s (tones U)

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Note: These estimates include productions from Nigeria and Zaria.

ny technical and economic problems involved, Nigeria's nuclear ambition can be said to be feasible in terms of natural uranium and manpower potential. But the technical and economic problems are enormous, and Nigeria has not even begun seriously to address the very basic elements of these problems. First, unlike Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq and Libya, physical facilities are non-existent, or at best inchoate; and this problem is complicated by the fact that choice as regards reactor type has not been considered. Yet to achieve a nuclear growth requires that reactors would have to be built as well as reactor enrichment and fuel reprocessing facilities.

The question of techniques goes along with the question of costs (UNCD, 1978). While this dual question cannot be easily swept aside, the irony of the Nigerian situation is that present debate focuses almost entirely on political rhetorical aspects while ignoring the fundamental issue of choice of nuclear reactor type. At least three stages of choice in a nuclear programme are inescapable:

(1) Reactor operation involving a single use of uranium without fuel reprocessing.
(2) The processing of used fuel to extract and recycle plutonium and uranium.
(3) Operation of fast breeder reactors (WAES, 1980). Although much of the technical debates centre on stages (2) and (3), the decision to go ahead with stage (1) and provide the basic nuclear energy facilities could be withheld because the critical issues in stages (2) and (3) have not been resolved.

Another technical problem is that the issues of nuclear safety seem to have been glossed over in the national debate. The most serious of these safety problems is that of containment of radioactivity. The crux of the problem is how to deal with spent fuel elements and the resulting radioactive wastes, which remain active for several hundred years. As Professor Cyril Agodi Onwumechili, the Nigerian expert and former Vice-chancellor of the University of Ife has correctly remarked: "whether you store the waste in the form of liquid like the British or you solidify it to reduce the volume like the Americans, the real problem is that it remains highly radioactive and toxic for many years (West Africa, 1980). More problematic is the safety of nuclear power plants, particularly the consequences of a failure or a sabotage, which could lead to a release of radioactivity.

The third problem of considerable concern for nuclear weapons manufacture is obtaining the right type of materials that are usable for nuclear weapons. Natural uranium (U-238) contains only 0.7 percent fissile U-235 nuclei, and must go to an enrichment plant where the concentration of U-235 is increased to 3 percent for light Water Reactor (LWC) fuel.

The point is that uranium for power reactor fuel at 3 or even 4% enrichment in U-235 content of 20 percent to obtain plutonium, which is usable in nuclear weapons. Since plutonium does not occur in nature but as a transuranic element, obtaining this material for weapons requires complicated equipment on a specialized nuclear technology for handling, all of which are expensive. It is in this connection that the recent developments in fast-breeder technology and the outcome of the INFCE conference of February 1980, discussed above must be an eye-opener to African states aspiring to become nuclear powers (Nweke, 1985).

These technical and economic considerations do not augur well for nuclear development by African states because of the huge capital outlay and because of the reluctance of the nuclear powers to transfer the requisite technology. A way out of the bluff is, as Professor Mazrui aptly suggests it "to decolonize modernity", that is, to modernize without totally Westernizing which would imply that African states should seek by themselves the best way of transforming their military technology and potential without necessarily copying from western nuclear powers.

During the Nigerian civil war, Biafra relied as much on Awka-made weapons and the contrivances of Biafran scientists as on imported arms. Thus, in this respect, Nigeria has an advantage in that she has a strong base of indigenous technological know-how in Awka upon which to build (Nweke, 1985).

Specifically, the Mazrui thesis is a plea for the integration of indigenous military technology with modern military science and technology of nuclear powers such as India, China, Japan and Russia. It would also imply collaboration with nuclear threshold Third World countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan and South Korea.
Summary and Conclusion

So far in this paper we have attempted to properly delineate what the two intriguing terms, African security and 21st century nuclear regime really mean. While ‘African security’ here refers to general safeguards against such (socio-economic) threats as hunger, disease, natural disasters and environmental pollution; (political) threats of neo-colonialism and, of course (military) threats in an age of competitive arms race involving nuclear weapons. The paper also posits that the term African security means safeguards against threats to life and property and the territorial integrity of not only the individual nation states that constitute the continent but also African continent as a collectively and a pan-African entity.

Upon identifying the potential threats to the African security the paper presents some credible arguments to show that such threats require not only disparate or individual state's efforts to contain but a home-grown collective action founded on the principle of pan-Africanism. In defining a new bold path to African security particularly in a 21st century being characterized by massive acquisition of nuclear weapons and other forms of arms by even. Third World countries outside Africa, the paper made no pretenses. Thus it recommends four options, namely, isolationism, regionalism, globalization and above all, nuclearization of the continent. Worthy of note also is that in recommending a nuclear option, the paper did not fail to analyze the on-going debate for and against the option but also draws attention to the prospects and potential obstacles that lie ahead a possible nuclearization programme.

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